As we approach Day 10 of theIsrael-Iran crisis, the focus is on whether diplomacy can succeed and, if not, whether President Donald Trump will make the decision touse US military forceto destroy what’s left of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure — particularly thedeeply buried enrichment facilityknown as Fordow.
The situation as of Saturday, two days after President Trumpgave two weeksto test diplomacy, appeared to have reached a steady state. This includes Israel’s control of Iranian skies and striking targets at will, as well as Iran still being able to launch missile barrages albeit in smaller numbers at Israel. Militarily, this equation ultimately favors Israel, whose position is likely strengthening further this week.
But that is a tactical equation and does not lead to a clear strategic endgame, particularly with respect to Iran’s nuclear program. So where is this crisis headed? I see four possible scenarios:
This remains the preferred outcome. But after this week’stalks in Genevabetween Iran and European allies, it’s not trending well. Those talks went nowhere. Iran held to its positions from before the crisis. The US was not present. And the entire backdrop — the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva, where the JCPOA was negotiated ten years ago — was reminiscent of another era.
There may be more direct engagements ongoing with United States and Iran (likely through Qataris and Omanis) but short of that, the diplomatic track has no real traction. This is unfortunate, as it’s the best way to end the crisis — and all Iran needs to do is signal to Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, that it is prepared to agree to the proposal he presented to Iran about six weeks ago.
That proposal is reportedly a balanced one, resulting in Iran giving up its enrichment program but over time and as part of an international consortium to supply nuclear fuel for a peaceful and monitored civilian-nuclear program.
Iran’s refusal to engage directly on this proposal both before the crisis and especially now may be a fatal and fateful mistake. If there is one off-ramp available, it’s this one.
The US is continuing toposition military assetsin the Middle East and will soon have three Carrier Strike Groups in the theater. This is a massive show of force, and has not been seen since 2012, notably at another point of stalled diplomacy with Iran on its nuclear program and with Iran threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to American sanctions.
Trump has clearly given the order to position and prepare for a strike. That can help reinforce the diplomacy as Iran must know at the end of the two-week deadline, the United States is prepared to use force to render Fordow inoperable, and Iran has no chance of defending against such an operation. The more the United States appears to be gearing up for such an operation, the more likely Iran might be ready in the end to make a deal the US can accept.
As Anderson Cooper and Idiscussedshortly after Trump declared a two-week timeframe, “diplomacy with a deadline” can be effective and the buildup of military forces serves the dual purpose of reinforcing the diplomatic track while also preparing for a strike should diplomacy fail. At the end of this period, Iran must understand that it will not have enrichment facilities – currently, ten cascades of highly advanced centrifuges – at Fordow.
That can be archived diplomatically (preferred) or militarily.
While Trump has ordered the positioning for a strike, it’s unclear whether he might in the end order one.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Friday that Israel may have ways to take out Fordow without the United States. That might look like “Operation Many Ways,” which I’vediscussedthis past week on AC360. Operation Many Ways was an Israeli commando raid last September against a deeply buried Iranian missile facility in Syria.
The facility was nearly the same depth as Fordow and naming the operation “Many Ways” was a signal to Iran that Israel has just that when it comes to destroying deeply buried facilities.
I’m doubtful as to the feasibility of such an operation in Iran, however. It’s high risk and a vast distance. A nuclear enrichment site is also far different from a missile facility. But no doubt the Israelis are looking at all options here and they don’t want to complete the military campaign with the Fordow facility intact. So if the Americans stay on the sidelines, expect the Israelis to try something on their own on Fordow.
In the wake of either of 2 or 3 above, I believe Israel could declare the end of major operations. Iran would respond, but from an Israeli and US perspective there would be an endpoint once Fordow is dismantled together with the other main nuclear facilities at Natanz and Isfahan, which are already damaged.
Short of the three options laid out above, the most likely course is the crisis simply goes on. That would mean Israel continues to control Iran’s airspace. It continues to strike targets. Iran continues to muster barrages at times, but its missile stockpile (and launchers will deplete).
This scenario is an inconclusive end with Iran still having massive enrichment capabilities but Israel hovering over Iran to ensure they’re never used, as fledgling diplomacy continues in the background.
My Assessment:I think at this stage we’re most likely to see either option 2 or option 4 even while continuing to do all we can to push for option 1 — the diplomatic resolution.
So, given that the preferred endgame is diplomacy, yet with talks going nowhere, how might diplomacy be invigorated over the coming week?
First, the United States should make clear the two-week deadline is real and that if Iran refuses to engage constructively, then a strike will be the inevitable result of Iran’s own poor choices. That deadline together with a credible offer to Iran — which has been on the table since before the crisis — remains the best possible chance for a diplomatic offramp.
Second, is a more creative possibility. Sometimes in a crisis, you want to enlarge the problem set, and here – that means Gaza. The Gaza conflict is ongoing in the background of the Iran crisis. There is now a deal on the table backed by Israel for a 60-day ceasefire in Gaza in exchange for Hamas releasing half the living hostages (10 of 20). Hamas has rejected that deal, but it did so before Israel’s attack into Iran and the removal of many of its Iranian backers, such as the leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
In my experience with Hamas, it can be far more flexible when its allies have suffered defeats, as happened with the Gaza ceasefire deal earlier this year following Israel’s defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon and a subsequent ceasefire deal in Lebanon.
Thus, one idea might be the 60-day ceasefire in Gaza together with a 60-day freeze on enrichment in Iran with an aim to find more permanent solutions at the end of this two-month period. Israel is in such a position of strength it might be amenable to this and the U.S. could help broker it as a means for defusing the broader Middle East crises and in a manner that does not allow Iran or Hamas to regroup.
After all, the fastest way to end the horror in Gaza is for Hamas to release just ten hostages, and the fastest way to end the crisis with Iran is for Iran to accept the deal that Witkoff proposed earlier this year. There may be merit in trying these together, particularly as both Iran and Hamas are in their weakest state in years.
At bottom, President Trump has bought some time and space with his “two-week” deadline, together with a preference for a diplomatic resolution. But now three days into that two-week period, there appears to be little momentum on the diplomatic track even as U.S. forces continue their massive buildup in the region.