In January, after the two-year siege of the Congolese city of Goma ended with victory for the M23 rebels and Rwandan troops, an ill-assorted group of nearly 300 white mercenaries were lined up to have their humiliating defeat televised.“You must not joke with us,” barked Willy Ngoma, the M23’s military spokesperson, at one man he’d ordered to sit on the ground with his hands clasped behind his head.The day before, on 28 January, the M23 militia and Rwandan soldiers had together captured the largest city in the eastern DRC. It was a spectacular defeat, not just for Congolese forces, but also for the Europeans whom the government had hoped would protect Goma.Congolese leaders have a history of employing white mercenaries. They led infamous campaigns against rebels in the turbulent years afterindependence from Belgiumin 1960. Former Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko also hired ex-Yugoslav mercenaries as his regime collapsed in the 1990s.View image in fullscreenThe DRC’s commander in chief, Maj Gen Louis Bobozo (left) with the French mercenary Col Bob Denard in Kisangani in October 1966.Photograph: Bettmann/Getty ImagesIn late 2022, with the M23 surrounding Goma, the DRC government hired two private-military firms. One, named Agemira, was made up of about 40 former French security personnel who provided intelligence and logistical support to the Congolese army.The bulk of the mercenaries came from a second firm headed by Horațiu Potra, a Transylvanian and former French legionnaire, known for handling security for politicians and mining sites inAfrica. At their height, Potra’s men in DRC, who were predominantly Romanian, numbered about 1,000. In security circles, they were known as “the Romeos”.The operation was sloppy, marred by pay disputes and equipment shortages. It deployed ex-members of the security forces but also untrained recruits, such as supermarket guards, according to a one-year joint investigation from the Guardian, Romania’s Public Record and Belgium’s Le Soir. The Romeos also worked closely with local militias and participated in combat.As Congolese and allied military forces around Goma crumbled between 27 and 28 January, the Romeos made a run for the main UN base in the city centre, abandoning equipment, rifles and jeeps. “They were imminently going to be killed,” says a senior UN official, who asked to remain anonymous. M23 fighters then arrived at the UN base and gave the Romeos two hours to surrender. Some scaled the walls of the adjacent Serena Hotel to look down into the compound, creating panic inside.View image in fullscreenMembers of the M23 rebel group in Goma supervise the exit of mercenaries on 29 January, a day after M23 and Rwandan forces captured the city.Photograph: Arlette Bashizi/Reuters“It was a real, real crisis,” says the senior UN official, who added that high-stakes negotiations involving world presidents led to an extraction deal, an account confirmed by two other UN sources.After the M23 military spokesperson had finished scolding them, the Romeos boarded UN buses with caged windows. More than 280 mercenaries from the original 1,000 – many left before Goma’s fall – were driven to the Rwandan border and flown home. At least four had been killed during their two-year deployment in North Kivu province. “It was a circus,” says one Romanian ex-special forces member, who stayed in the DRC for only six weeks because conditions were so dire.In 2022, word had spread quickly in Romanian security circles that Potra was recruiting. Underpaid men with mortgages and families jumped at the opportunity. Some, like Potra, were ex-French foreign legionnaires. Some were just his mates. Others were security guards, or former (and serving) army or police, who sometimes took unpaid leave to sign up.On arrival in Goma, contractors signed a three-page contract. The salary was between $5,000-$6,000 (3,900-£4,600) a month, depending on seniority, according to four different contracts signed between 2022 and 2024 and seen by the Guardian.View image in fullscreenHoratiu Potra, whose firm recruited as many as 1,000 Romanians to work with the Congolese army.Photograph: Octav Ganea/Inquam PhotosInitially, they signed with a UK-registered company called GPH La Role Ltd, owned by Potra’s brother, before contracts were transferred to a Congolese-registered company, Amani Sarl. The contract was three months on, one month off, with no medical insurance. Potra’s company provided a bulletproof vest and an AK-47. Any other equipment, the contractors had to buy for themselves.For Victor Railean, a Moldovan private security officer who first met Potra in 2019, this nonetheless represented a significant opportunity. He went to DRC to build a nest egg for his son, whom he loved “madly”, according to his sister Victoria Gonț. Railean was shot in February 2024 during an ambush in the volcanic hills about 15 miles (25km) from Goma. He died from his wounds. Vasile Badea, a former Romanian policeman, was also killed that day. Their group had requested extraction beforehand, according to WhatsApp voice recordings reviewed by the Guardian.They were lying about our numbers. Instead of having 100 people in the field, they had 70. In the end, the company’s goal was profitContractorOne contractor told Potra during the battle: “We can’t move because they’re hunting us with snipers. If we leave here they’ll blow your head off.”A survivor of the ambush told the Guardian: “Very big mistakes were made, they were pointed out, they weren’t rectified. As a result, boys died.”Five contractors described a disorganised operation, with untrained and unsuitable recruits. Two western officials in Goma estimated that only about 30% of the contractors had served in the French Foreign Legion.“When you bring in truck drivers, security guards and people over 60 … I realised this wasn’t well organised, so I asked to go home,” says the recruit who described Potra’s private military firm as “a circus”.View image in fullscreenRomanian contractors in Sake, North Kivu, after an M23 rebel offensive in the region in April 2023.Photograph: De Viguerie Veronique/Paris Match/GettyThe contractors were deployed to fortified positions near frontlines in hills north of Goma and around a contested satellite town to the north-west. Officially, their contracts stated they would conduct “training, qualification and certification of local security staff”.Felix Tshisekedi, the president of the DRC, hasdeniedthey were mercenaries, saying they provided “coaching” on the battlefield. However, video footage and testimony points to a military operation.skip past newsletter promotionSign up toGlobal DispatchFree newsletterGet a different world view with a roundup of the best news, features and pictures, curated by our global development teamEnter your email addressSign upPrivacy Notice:Newsletters may contain info about charities, online ads, and content funded by outside parties. For more information see ourPrivacy Policy. We use Google reCaptcha to protect our website and the GooglePrivacy PolicyandTerms of Serviceapply.after newsletter promotionThere was a “quick reaction force” to extract men under attack, teams flying surveillance drones and others coordinating artillery strikes. Romeos dressed in military fatigues fired heavy machine guns and operated mortars, according to footage. In some cases, they said they fired artillery themselves.One, with combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, says mortar teams fired at M23 positions during two weeks in spring 2024. He stopped participating in attacks because they were beyond his contract or pay grade. “I [was] participating in military operations on the house [for free],” he says.View image in fullscreenA Romanian military contractor undergoes a security check at the Grande Barrier border crossing with Rwanda, as he is evacuated from Goma on 29 January.Photograph: Thomas Mukoya/ReutersPay disputes were frequent among the Romeos. There were also tensions within the Congolese troops – paid about $100 a month – over the mercenaries’ salaries.The DRC is among the five poorest countries in the world,accordingto the World Bank, and more than 70% of the population survives on less than $2.15 a day. According to four contractors, Potra’s firm overcounted the manpower numbers.“They were lying about our numbers. Instead of having 100 people in the field, they had 70,” said one contractor, explaining that he’d pretended to live in four different housing units to fool inspectors. Contractors also perceived equipment shortages as cost-cutting measures. “In the end, the company’s goal was profit,” said one.Neither Potra nor the Congolese presidency responded to requests for comment. The Congolese army spokesperson said he had “no comment to make”.The fall of Goma: 16 days of chaos and fear – in picturesRead moreThe M23 captured large territories in eastern DRC after launching an offensive in late 2021. In response, the DRC’s weak army began relying on pro-government militias, collectively known in Swahili asWazalendo– patriots. The Wazalendo range from unstructured groups to organised militias with thousands of fighters, such as the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) or the Coalition of Movements for Change (CMC), whose leaders face sanctions for crimes including the recruitment of child soldiers.View image in fullscreenMen believed to be Romanian military contractors are escorted to their transport after crossing the border into Rwanda on 29 January.Photograph: Tony Karumba/AFP/Getty ImagesThe Romeos cooperated with local militias, providing money and ammunition, according to audio recordings and interviews. Some of the militias have been accused of war crimes, which could make the Romeos complicit, according to legal experts the Guardian spoke to.However, it is not clear which militia groups they cooperated with, as none of the fighters interviewed specified. One contractor says the relationship was strained “until we started giving them money”.Security officials say the Romeos were aware of legal limits to their engagements. Contractors interviewed insist they weren’t mercenaries. “If you’re from the west, you’re a military contractor. If you’re from the east, you’re a mercenary,” scoffs one.Whether a military contractor is legally a mercenary is complex, but it can have consequences in jurisdictions such as France, which bans mercenary activity. Many Romanian instructors, as former legionnaires, have French nationality.View image in fullscreenSome of the men who worked in DRC say they are now struggling to find work after being labelled as mercenaries.Photograph: Thomas Mukoya/Reuters“These actors are multiplying and it’s crucial to consider creating an independent investigative body that could support accountability efforts,” says Jelena Aparac, former president of the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries.Last year, Potra hosted a journalist from Romania’s public broadcaster to observe his men training Congolese troops. However, one contractor says that was set up: “We only pretended to train people when the press came.” Another says he is struggling to find work after being labelled a mercenary. “It’s a problem we all have. Barely any of us can get hired now.”This independent investigation was supported by grants fromJournalismfund Europe, theIJ4EU fundand theHenry Nxumalo FoundationandViewfinder. These funders or any other of their partners are not responsible for the content published and any use made of it.
Supermarket guards, truck drivers and ‘very big mistakes’: the failed role of western mercenaries in the fall of Goma
TruthLens AI Suggested Headline:
"Analysis of the Role and Failures of Western Mercenaries in Goma's Fall"
TruthLens AI Summary
In January 2023, the Congolese city of Goma fell to the M23 rebels and Rwandan troops, marking a significant defeat for the Congolese government and the mercenaries it had hired to defend the city. Nearly 300 mercenaries, primarily from Romania and led by Horațiu Potra, were deployed to assist Congolese forces during the siege. Their operation was characterized by disorganization, with significant issues such as pay disputes, equipment shortages, and the inclusion of untrained recruits, including supermarket guards. As Congolese and allied military forces collapsed under pressure from the M23, the mercenaries faced a dire situation, leading to a chaotic retreat to the UN base where they were ultimately extracted under high-stakes negotiations. This incident has drawn parallels to the historical use of mercenaries in the DRC, highlighting the ongoing struggles faced by the Congolese military and government in securing effective defense against armed groups.
The mercenaries, often referred to as 'Romeos', were initially contracted to provide training and support to Congolese troops but ended up directly engaged in combat. Their contracts, which promised salaries between $5,000 and $6,000 per month, lacked medical insurance and left many contractors dissatisfied with the conditions on the ground. Reports indicate that only about 30% of the contractors had prior military experience, leading to further complications during combat situations. The mercenaries' operations were marred by a lack of coordination and accountability, resulting in tragic losses, including deaths during ambushes. The fallout from this operation has led to questions about the legal status of these mercenaries, as well as their long-term employability given the stigma attached to their roles in the DRC. As the situation unfolds, calls for independent investigations into the activities of private military contractors in conflict zones continue to grow, emphasizing the need for accountability and oversight in such delicate engagements.
TruthLens AI Analysis
The article sheds light on the involvement of Western mercenaries during the fall of Goma, highlighting their failures and the overarching implications of their presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It reflects on historical precedents of mercenary use in the region while drawing attention to the inadequacies faced by these hired forces.
Intent of the Article
There seems to be a deliberate effort to critique the efficacy of Western mercenaries in conflict zones, especially in Africa. By showcasing their shortcomings and the catastrophic consequences of their involvement, the article aims to question the reliance of Congolese leaders on foreign military support. This could also serve to raise awareness about the complexities of international military interventions and the potential for exploitation within these relationships.
Perception Management
The article likely seeks to foster a sense of skepticism regarding Western military interventions in African conflicts. By focusing on the humiliation faced by the mercenaries, it could create a narrative that portrays these interventions as ineffective and possibly detrimental to local governance and stability. The mention of unqualified recruits, such as supermarket guards, underscores the absurdity of relying on poorly trained personnel for serious military engagements.
Omissions and Concealments
While the article discusses the failures of mercenaries, it might obscure the broader geopolitical context that led to such interventions. The motivations of Congolese leaders and the implications of foreign involvement on local sovereignty are not deeply explored. This could suggest a selective emphasis on failures rather than a balanced view of the complexities involved in the conflict.
Trustworthiness of the Content
The article appears to be based on investigative reporting, drawing from multiple sources, including joint investigations by reputable media. However, the framing of the narrative may introduce biases, particularly against mercenaries and foreign intervention. It is essential to consider the potential for sensationalism in the portrayal of events, leading to a somewhat skewed perception of reality.
Societal Implications
The information presented could stir public sentiment against foreign military presence in the DRC, potentially influencing political discourse and policy decisions. If the article resonates with the populace, it may catalyze calls for greater accountability from both local leaders and foreign actors involved in the conflict.
Target Audience
The narrative likely appeals to those critical of foreign intervention in Africa, including activists, scholars, and individuals concerned about neocolonial practices. It may also resonate with audiences interested in military and geopolitical issues, particularly within the context of Africa.
Economic and Market Impact
Given the focus on mercenaries and military operations, the article could influence investors' perceptions regarding stability in the DRC. Companies involved in mining or other sectors in the region may face increased scrutiny. Stocks related to these industries could experience volatility based on the public’s reaction to the article’s content.
Geopolitical Context
The article holds relevance in discussions about the power dynamics between Western nations and African states. It reflects ongoing debates about sovereignty, military ethics, and the role of mercenaries in modern conflicts, connecting to broader themes of international relations.
AI Influence
While it is unclear if AI was directly involved in the article's creation, the structured presentation and thorough analysis suggest potential use of AI tools for data organization or fact-checking. If AI was employed, it may have influenced the narrative to emphasize critical viewpoints on foreign military involvement. In conclusion, the article serves to critique the role of Western mercenaries in the DRC, emphasizing their failures and questioning the wisdom of foreign military interventions. Its focus on humiliation and inadequacy aims to shape public perception against such practices, while possibly omitting broader contextual factors.